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Recent Decisions
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
DARDEN v. PETERS : GIVING DEFERENCE WHERE
DEFERENCE MAY NOT BE DUE
In Darden v. Peters,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered the standard of review that courts should
apply when reviewing a denial of copyright protection by the Register
of Copyrights (the Register).2  The court held that if such a denial is
challenged under the judicial review provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act (the APA),3 an abuse of discretion standard is neces-
sary.4  Although the court correctly interpreted and applied the stan-
dard set forth in the APA,5 its holding raises the question of whether
the Register’s determinations as to copyrightability warrant an abuse
of discretion standard, given that determinations of copyrightability
require no technical expertise.6  The court should have applied a de
novo standard of review for copyright protection, thereby eliminating
separation of powers concerns that potentially arise when the judiciary
gives deference to the Register on questions of law.7
I. THE CASE
William Darden developed a website named “appraisers.com,” a
referral service through which users could locate real estate appraisers
in the United States by navigating and clicking on digital maps.8
Darden hired Sean Pecor to design the maps so as to enable users to
find appraisers in particular locations by clicking on regions of the
Copyright  2008 by Raisa L. Michalek.
The author wishes to thank Professor Lawrence Sung for his invaluable assistance with the
conception and composition of this Note; Todd Hesel for exceptional, patient editing with
a firm hand; and Judge Thomas Motley for extraordinary guidance.
1. 488 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2007).
2. Id. at 283–86.
3. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2000).
4. Darden, 488 F.3d at 286.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part IV.C.
8. Darden, 488 F.3d at 280.
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maps.9  Pecor began with a digital Census map of the United States
and added coloring and shading to achieve a three-dimensional ef-
fect.10  Pecor also labeled each state and delineated counties within
each state, which, if clicked on, would reveal a listing of local apprais-
ers.11  Pecor assigned to Darden any copyright interest he possessed in
the completed maps and website design.12
In May 2002, Darden filed two applications for copyright registra-
tion with the United States Copyright Office (the Copyright Office).13
In the first application, Darden sought to register his website as a tech-
nical drawing, based on “graphics, text, colors, and arrangement” that
Pecor had added to the original Census maps.14  In the second appli-
cation, Darden sought to register the maps as derivative works, based
on “font and color selection; visual effects such as relief, shadowing,
and shading; labeling; [and] call-outs”15 that altered the original Cen-
sus maps.16
The Copyright Office rejected both applications.17  The exam-
iner, citing lack of authorship that would have merited copyright pro-
tection of the maps, explained that the minor variations to the
original Census maps were insufficient to add the minimum amount
of originality required.18  With respect to registration of the website as
a technical drawing, the examiner noted that APPRAISERSdotCOM
contained neither a technical drawing nor the minimum amount of
originality required and, thus, was ineligible for copyright protec-
tion.19  The examiner suggested, however, that Darden file an
amended application for APPRAISERSdotCOM based on the text and
level of compilation, which, the examiner noted, could “support a
copyright claim, if they [were] original.”20
Reasserting the originality of the alterations to the maps, Darden
requested reconsideration of his applications.21  Darden also filed an
amended application to register APPRAISERSdotCOM as a compila-
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. A “call-out” is “a letter, word, number or other symbol identifying a specific part of
an illustration.” THE OXFORD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 201 (2d ed. 2007).
16. Darden, 488 F.3d at 280 (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 280–81.
19. Id. at 281.
20. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Id.
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tion and derivative work.22  The Copyright Office denied both re-
quests and again rejected Darden’s applications.23  In support of the
denial, the examiner clarified that, in order for copyright protection
to apply to derivative works, the added portion must be sufficiently
original.24  The examiner further explained that, with respect to AP-
PRAISERSdotCOM, changes to layout, size, format, spacing, and col-
oring did not render the website eligible for copyright protection as a
compilation.25
Darden appealed the denial of his applications to the Copyright
Office Board of Appeals (the Board), which affirmed the denial of
registration for both the maps and the website.26  The Board echoed
the reasoning of the examining division, finding that the maps lacked
creativity and that Darden’s application for registration of the website
elements was “too broad.”27
Darden then filed an action under the APA in the District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina against Marybeth Peters, the
Register of Copyrights.28  The district court, applying an abuse of dis-
cretion standard pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the APA,29 granted
the Register’s motion for summary judgment.30  Darden appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, claiming
that the district court should have applied a de novo standard of re-
view and that his maps and website met the minimum standard of
originality required for copyright protection.31
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Any copyright applicant may challenge a denial of copyright re-
gistration in one of two ways: (1) the applicant may bring an infringe-
ment action under section 411(a) of the Copyright Act32 if there is
potential infringement;33 or (2) the applicant may bring a direct ac-
22. Id.
23. Id. at 282.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Id. at 282–83.
29. Section 706(2)(A) requires courts to give substantial deference to the determina-
tions of agencies, which may be overturned if the agency abused its discretion.  5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (2000).
30. Darden, 488 F.3d at 283 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
31. Id. at 283–84.
32. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2000).
33. Id. § 411(a).
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tion for judicial review of the denial under the APA.34  In an infringe-
ment action, the issue of copyrightability is reviewed de novo.35  In an
action under the APA, by contrast, the Register’s denial of registration
is reviewed under the more deferential “abuse of discretion” stan-
dard.36  The Supreme Court of the United States has also extended
APA deference to decisions by the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office (the PTO), citing the PTO’s technical expertise in issues
of patentability.37
A. A Majority of Courts Review the Issue of Copyrightability in
Infringement Actions Using a De Novo Standard of Review
If a copyright applicant elects to bring an action for copyright
infringement under Section 411(a), the issue of copyrightability is a
question of law to be determined by the courts.38  A claimant alleging
infringement must establish “copying of constituent elements of the
work that are copyrightable.”39  Addressing the standard of review in
infringement cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., opined that “the
mute testimony of [the work] put[s the court] in as good a position as
the Copyright Office to decide the issue [of copyrightability],”40 and
denied relief to the claimant upon independently determining that
34. Id. § 701(d); see also Atari Games Corp. v. Oman (Atari I), 888 F.2d 878, 880 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
35. See infra Part II.A.
36. See infra Part II.B.
37. See infra Part II.C.
38. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1985); see also
Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that copyrightability “is
strictly an issue for the court”); Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25,
34 n.5 (1st Cir. 2001) (“The extent to which [the work] contain[s] protected expression is
a matter of law, determined by the court”); Publ’ns Int’l v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473,
478 (7th Cir. 1996) (reasoning that the question of whether a work constitutes copyright-
able subject matter involves statutory interpretation and is, therefore, subject to de novo
review); Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1253 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that
“[t]he protectability of elements of a copyrighted work is a question of law for the court”),
aff’d, 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003), amended on other grounds by 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir.
2004). But see John Muller & Co. v. N.Y. Arrows Soccer Team, 802 F.2d 989, 990 (8th Cir.
1986) (per curiam) (applying an abuse of discretion standard to the Register’s decision as
to copyrightability); Norris Indus. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir.
1983) (same).
39. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2004).
40. 773 F.2d at 414 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Atari I, 888 F.2d 878,
886–87, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Silberman, J., concurring) (distinguishing the APA’s defer-
ential standard of review from “an infringement action in which the court [is] not obliged
to defer to an agency’s action or interpretation”).
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the allegedly infringed work was not copyrightable.41  As such,
copyrightability can be decided as a matter of law.42
The chief consideration in this analysis is whether the work is
original.43  The Supreme Court has held that the United States Consti-
tution requires originality as a prerequisite for copyright protection.44
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,45 the Supreme
Court described the requirements of originality and denied copyright
protection for a telephone book on the ground that facts are gener-
ally not copyrightable.46  The Court clarified that the level of original-
ity required is “extremely low” and will be met if there is even “a slight
amount” of creativity.47  As such, the Court observed, “compilations of
facts are within the subject matter of copyright”48 if their “selection,
coordination, and arrangement” meet the originality standard.49  The
Court, however, recognized that there is a category of works not sus-
ceptible to copyright protection because “the creative spark is utterly
lacking.”50  Finally, the Court noted that originality does not require
that the work be novel and, indeed, that two authors may indepen-
dently compose identical works that are equally copyrightable.51
B. Courts Review the Issue of Copyrightability in Actions Under the
APA Using an Abuse of Discretion Standard
Contrary to judicial review of copyrightability in an infringement
action, courts will apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to
41. Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 412, 414.
42. Id.; see also, e.g., Collezione Europa U.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsdale House, Ltd., 243 F.
Supp. 2d 444, 451–52 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
43. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“The sine qua
non of copyright is originality.”).
44. Id. at 346.
45. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
46. Id. at 344–45, 364.
47. Id. at 345.  However, the Feist Court held that the copied elements of the telephone
book at issue consisted exclusively of uncopyrightable factual data and that the compila-
tion did not exhibit sufficiently original selection, coordination, or arrangement to merit
copyright protection. Id. at 361–62.
48. Id. at 345.  The Court stressed, however, that facts alone are not subject to copy-
right protection. Id.
49. Id. at 362; see also Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] combina-
tion of unprotectable elements is eligible for copyright protection only if those elements
are numerous enough and their selection and arrangement original enough that their
combination constitutes an original work of authorship.”); Dam Things from Den. v. Russ
Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 563 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that copyright protection of deriva-
tive works applies only to “elements . . . added to the work” and may not extend to “the
underlying work”).
50. Feist, 499 U.S. at 359.
51. Id. at 345–46.
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the Register’s decisions if they are challenged under the APA.52  The
plain language of the APA, as well as the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of it, mandates an abuse of discretion standard for actions that
directly challenge the Register’s denial of copyright protection.53  De-
spite being widely accepted, judicial deference to agency determina-
tions under the APA nevertheless implicates the notion of separation
of powers.54
1. The APA
The Copyright Act specifies that all challenges to the Register’s
actions and determinations regarding copyrightability under the Cop-
yright Act are subject to review under the Administrative Procedure
Act.55  The APA, codified in title 5 of the United States Code, provides
that action by government agencies is subject to judicial review “ex-
cept to the extent that . . . statutes preclude judicial review; or . . .
agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.”56
Unlike the court’s unfettered de novo analysis in infringement
actions under section 411(a) of the Copyright Act, the APA confines
courts to a more limited role.57  Specifically, the APA allows a court to
overturn an agency’s decision if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”58
In the landmark case of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,59
the Supreme Court defined the parameters of APA review, affirming
52. Atari Games Corp. v. Oman (Atari II), 979 F.2d 242, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1992); OddzOn
Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Coach, Inc. v. Peters, 386 F. Supp.
2d 495, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
53. See infra Part II.B.1.
54. See infra Part II.B.2.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 701(e) (2000).
56. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2000).
57. Section 706(2) of the APA states that courts should set aside agency actions if they
are “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; [or] (D) without
observance of procedure required by law.” Id. § 706(2)(A)–(D); see also United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–28 (2001) (applying a deferential standard to review
agency action under the APA); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
413–14 (1971) (same), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105
(1977); Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Leavitt, 470 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2006) (same); Sierra
Club v. Marsh, 976 F.2d 763, 769 (1st Cir. 1992) (same); Hickory Neighborhood Def.
League v. Skinner, 910 F.2d 159, 162 (4th Cir. 1990) (same); Wilkinson v. Abrams, 627
F.2d 650, 662 (3d Cir. 1980) (same).
58. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
59. 401 U.S. 402 (1971), abrogated on other grounds by Califano, 430 U.S. at 105.  The
Overton Park Court ultimately remanded the case to the district court for a determination
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-4\MLR407.txt unknown Seq: 7 15-MAY-08 10:35
2008] DARDEN V. PETERS 865
that agency action reviewed under the APA is entitled to deference.60
Although APA review is narrow,61 the Court in Overton Park clarified
that it does not allow an agency to omit a satisfactory explanation for a
challenged decision.62  The Court further explained that the review-
ing court will examine whether the agency properly considered all rel-
evant factors in making its determination.63  It has also been
established that a court may overturn an agency’s decision if the
agency applied the wrong legal standard64 or considered factors it
should not have considered.65
The APA identifies two exceptions to judicial application of a def-
erential standard of review: courts have no jurisdiction to review
agency action that is committed to agency discretion by law; and
courts may undertake expanded, non-deferential review of agency ac-
tion if the agency action was unwarranted by the facts.66  First, the
Supreme Court has clarified that the statutory exception for cases in
which action is committed to agency discretion by law is limited to
those cases in which the statutory language is so broad that, in effect,
“there is no law to apply.”67  Second, the Court has also narrowly con-
of whether the Department of Transportation’s explanation for its challenged action was
sufficient. Id. at 420–21.
60. Id. at 413–14.
61. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
62. 401 U.S. at 420–21; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43 (clarifying that the
agency must “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connec-
tion between the facts found and the choice made” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))).
63. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420–21; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43 (explain-
ing the need for a court to examine the pertinent factors).
64. Turgeau v. Admin. Review Bd., 446 F.3d 1052, 1057 (10th Cir. 2006).  In Turgeau,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed a decision of the Admin-
istrative Review Board (the ARB) where the ARB had found that the petitioner’s state law
claim was completely preempted by a federal law claim and had subsequently granted sum-
mary judgment to the petitioner’s employer. Id. at 1054–55.  The court of appeals held
that because a completely preempted state law claim states a federal claim as a matter of
law, the ARB was wrong in dismissing the petitioner’s claim. Id. at 1054, 1060.
65. Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43 (holding that an agency decision is also arbitrary
if the agency “offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view
or the product of agency expertise”).
66. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410, 414.
67. See id. at 410, 413 (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 212 (1945)) (rejecting an argu-
ment that the Secretary of Transportation’s decision was committed solely to agency discre-
tion by emphasizing that this was not a case where there was no law to apply).  The
respondents in Overton Park argued that the statute at issue, which directed the Secretary of
Transportation to balance competing interests regarding the use of public parkland, com-
mitted the inquiry to the Secretary’s complete discretion because it was merely a general
directive for the Secretary to consider all interests. Id. at 411–13.  The Court rejected this
argument on the ground that “the very existence of the statutes indicates that protection of
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strued the exception contained in section 706(2)(F) of the APA,
which allows de novo review for agency action “unwarranted by the
facts.”68  In analyzing this exception, the Court has emphasized two
situations in which it applies: (1) when agency action is “adjudicatory
in nature and the agency factfinding procedures are inadequate”; and
(2) when issues that are raised to “enforce nonadjudicatory agency
action” were not before the agency and, thus, require “independent
judicial factfinding.”69
In general, the APA’s abuse of discretion standard comports with
the Supreme Court’s broader view, articulated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council,70 that agencies are entitled to defer-
ence in their decisionmaking.71
2. Separation of Powers Implications of the APA
While judicial deference to agencies under the APA is firmly es-
tablished and universally recognized,72 the APA’s abuse of discretion
standard nevertheless implicates the doctrine of separation of powers
because the APA addresses the review by one branch of government
of the decisions of another branch.73  The notion of separation of
powers is fundamental to the American system of government.74  It
parkland was to be given paramount importance” and, thus, that there was “law to apply.”
Id. at 412–13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (2000).
69. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415.  An example of nonadjudicatory agency action is a
public hearing regarding distribution of local funds for infrastructure, such as highway
construction.  Such a hearing is quasi-legislative in nature and “not designed to produce a
record that is to be the basis of agency action.” Id. at 414–15.
70. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
71. Id. at 844.  The Chevron Court, however, did not mention or cite to the APA in its
opinion.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241–42 & n.2 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
72. The volume of federal cases that have applied a deferential standard under the
APA supports this conclusion. See, e.g., supra note 57. R
73. See, e.g., Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 202 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing the signifi-
cance of judicial review of agency decisions and observing that such review implicates sepa-
ration of powers principles).
74. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372, 380–81 (1989) (discussing the
constitutional understanding of separation of powers and holding that Congress had not
upset the doctrine by requesting assistance from the other branches); see also Cheney v.
U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 381–82 (2004) (recognizing embarrassment to the executive
branch and “intrusion by the federal judiciary” on “federal-state relations” as “separation-
of-powers considerations” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Vieth v. Jube-
lirer, 541 U.S. 267, 302 (2004) (plurality opinion) (noting the existence of “lines of separa-
tion drawn by the Constitution between the three departments of the government”
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (observing that the Constitution
“enjoins upon [the branches of government] separateness but interdependence, auton-
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requires that the three branches of government maintain some de-
gree of separation and prohibits “intrusion”75 of one branch into the
affairs of another.76
The APA was enacted in part due to separation of powers con-
cerns and, indeed, the statute reflects such considerations.77  For ex-
ample, one justification for prohibiting reviewing courts from
substituting their judgment for that of the agency is the theory that
the executive branch, to preserve separation of powers, must possess
independent authority in certain areas.78  As such, one court has rea-
soned that de novo judicial review of decisions made pursuant to this
authority would constitute “interference” into the affairs of the Execu-
tive.79  Conversely, a complete lack of judicial review of agency action
would also violate separation of powers because the Executive would
have unchecked authority to act through its agencies.80
C. The Supreme Court Has Extended the APA’s Deferential Standard to
Actions Challenging a Denial of Patent Protection by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office
In Dickinson v. Zurko,81 the Supreme Court considered whether
the APA’s discretionary standard of review should apply to decisions
of the PTO.82  The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit contended, in particular, that the PTO should be exempt from
APA abuse of discretion review based on section 559 of the APA,
which states that the APA does not repeal “additional [judicial review]
omy but reciprocity”).  The Supreme Court has held that the judiciary’s power is to “say
what the law is.”  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
75. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).  In practice, courts apply the
doctrine flexibly and do not require complete separation of the branches.  United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974) (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concur-
ring)), superseded by rule on other grounds, FED. R. EVID. 104(a).  As such, each branch accords
the other two branches some amount of deference. Id. at 704, 706.
77. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 1989) (interpreting the
“committed-to-agency-discretion” provision in the APA as “in large measure a restatement
of the separation-of-powers problem”).
78. Local 2855 v. United States, 602 F.2d 574, 579 (3d Cir. 1979).
79. County of Esmeralda v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 925 F.2d 1216, 1223 (9th Cir. 1991)
(Wallace, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Local 2855, 602 F.2d at
579).
80. See Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 202 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that the ab-
sence of judicial review of deportation proceedings would violate separation of powers); see
also Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 929 n.6 (1991) (emphasizing the importance of
an “independent judiciary” in maintaining the governmental structure of checks and bal-
ances (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
81. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
82. Id. at 152–54.
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requirements.”83  The Court concluded that the APA’s abuse of dis-
cretion standard nevertheless applied, emphasizing that the PTO’s
technical expertise enables it to examine the issue of patentability bet-
ter than the judiciary and, thus, that its decisions must be granted
deference.84  The Court also acknowledged a long line of precedent
where courts had recognized the particular expertise of the PTO and
other agencies, and accorded them deference.85
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Darden v. Peters,86 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina and held that judicial review of cop-
yright determinations under the APA is confined to an abuse of dis-
83. Id. at 154 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2000)).  The Federal Circuit claimed that a differ-
ent standard of review had been in place for review of PTO decisions at the time the APA
was adopted and, hence, that the stricter “clearly erroneous” standard was an “additional
requirement” within the meaning of Section 559. Id. at 153–54.
84. Id. at 152, 160.  The Court observed, however, that the Federal Circuit has acquired
some expertise in the area of patents. Id. at 163. See generally Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476
F.3d 887, 903 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (observing that the Federal Circuit has “exclusive jurisdic-
tion of appeals on patent claims”).
85. Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 160–61 (citing NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 597
(1941); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 145–46 (1939); Interstate
Commerce Comm’n v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 98 (1913)); see also
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997) (equating deference to Congress with
“deference owed to administrative agencies because of their expertise”); Thomas Jefferson
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (stating, in review of a decision by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, that “[the APA’s] broad deference is all the more war-
ranted when, as here, the regulation concerns a complex and highly technical regulatory pro-
gram, in which the identification and classification of relevant criteria necessarily require
significant expertise and entail the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns”
(emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Martin v. Occupa-
tional Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991) (“[A]pplying an agency’s
regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the agency’s unique exper-
tise . . . .”); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 464–66 (1972)
(indicating that the technical expertise of agencies justifies application of a deferential
standard of judicial review).
Courts have further justified a more deferential standard of review in the context of
PTO decisions by pointing out that the PTO conducts a substantive evaluation of each
patent application prior to issuing a patent, a process not undertaken by the Register.
Stein v. Mazer, 111 F. Supp. 359, 360–61 (D. Md. 1953), rev’d on other grounds, 204 F.2d 472
(4th Cir. 1953).
Moreover, some courts have recognized the Register’s “expertise” in interpreting cop-
yright laws.  Mays & Assocs. Inc. v. Euler, 370 F. Supp. 2d 362, 369 (D. Md. 2005).  Such
recognition, however, is countered by the general expertise of courts in “interpreting and
applying the law” to the pertinent facts.  Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488, 492 (5th Cir.
1980); see also Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 277 (1974) (per curiam) (noting that
the judiciary’s role is in interpreting and applying law).
86. 488 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2007).
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cretion standard.87  Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Traxler
began by noting that the APA applies to judicial review of actions
taken by the Register of Copyrights pursuant to section 701(e) of the
Copyright Act.88  The court then noted that the district court’s deci-
sion to apply an abuse of discretion standard to the Register’s denial
of copyright protection was supported by the limited number of fed-
eral decisions addressing the issue.89  Rejecting William Darden’s
claim that denial of copyright registration should be reviewed under a
de novo standard because it has “constitutional ramifications,”90 the
court clarified that while Article I, Section 8 of the United States Con-
stitution gives “Congress the power to provide copyright protection,”
it does not require that Congress do so.91  Thus, the court reasoned,
any rights or remedies that Darden possessed with respect to his copy-
right claim were based exclusively in statute and lacked the constitu-
tional basis required to form an exception to abuse of discretion
review.92
The court next dismissed Darden’s claim that the Register’s de-
nial of his copyright application was “not in accordance with law”
under section 706(2)(A) of the APA.93  The court noted that Darden
was simply arguing that the Register’s result was incorrect, not that the
Register “applied the wrong legal standard or misapprehended or ig-
nored the controlling legal principles,” and that the court, therefore,
was only authorized to determine whether the Register considered all
appropriate factors.94
The court also addressed Darden’s contention that the court
should apply the same standard of review both in infringement ac-
tions under section 411(a) of the Copyright Act95 and in cases directly
reviewing denial of registration under the APA “for the sake of effi-
ciency and predictability.”96  The court reaffirmed that, although
87. Id. at 286.
88. Id. at 283 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 701(e) (2000)).
89. Id. (citing Atari II, 979 F.2d 242, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1992); OddzOn Prods., Inc. v.
Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 347–48 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Coach, Inc. v. Peters, 386 F. Supp. 2d 495,
497 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
90. Id. at 283–84.  Specifically, Darden argued that the APA’s mandate that the review-
ing court “interpret constitutional . . . provisions” in cases where the agency action violated
a claimant’s constitutional rights required that the court analyze his claim de novo. Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id. at 284.
92. Id.
93. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000)).
94. Id. at 284–85.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2000).
96. Darden, 488 F.3d at 285.
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copyrightability of a claim is generally a question of law in copyright
infringement actions under Section 411(a),97 greater deference is
given to the Register’s decision when the claimant is merely seeking to
set aside the denial of protection.98  The court justified the distinction
between the types of claims by noting that, although judicial review of
the denial of copyright protection is governed by the APA, infringe-
ment actions are not, and that, thus, the APA’s abuse of discretion
standard does not apply to infringement actions.99
The court then articulated its conclusion that the Register did
not abuse her discretion in deciding that neither of Darden’s works
exhibited the minimum level of original authorship, explaining that
APPRAISERSdotCOM and the maps fell into the category of works
that the Copyright Office considered uncopyrightable.100  Darden’s
maps, the court observed, were virtually identical to the original Cen-
sus maps except for changes in font, color, and shading, which did
not render them sufficiently original to merit copyright protection.101
The court distinguished from Darden cases where maps were found to
be “categorically eligible for copyright registration”102 and reasserted
its agreement with the Register that Darden had not added any copy-
rightable elements to his maps.103  The court further rejected
Darden’s argument that the confusion that his customers experienced
when they saw his maps on competing websites indicated originality
97. The court expressed ambivalence as to whether some deference is, indeed, ac-
corded the Register even in infringement actions and noted that courts are split on the
issue. Id. at 286 (citing John Muller & Co. v. N.Y. Arrows Soccer Team, 802 F.2d 989, 990
(8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (applying the abuse of discretion standard); Carol Barnhart
Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying de novo review);
Norris Indus. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying the
abuse of discretion standard)).  In Darden, however, the court concluded that, because
Darden sought review of the registration denial under the APA, the APA applied and the
court did not need to reach the issue of which standard was proper in infringement ac-
tions. Id.
98. Id. at 285.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 286–87 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2006)).
101. Id. at 287.
102. Id. (citing Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 746–48 (2d Cir.
1998) (discussing the eligibility of maps in an infringement suit but ultimately finding that
there was no infringement); Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 141–42 (5th
Cir. 1992) (finding copyrightable topographical maps to which elements demonstrating
originality had been added, including individual placement of numerous real estate
surveys, lines denoting various information, and symbols “in particular relation to one
another”)).
103. Id.
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worthy of copyright protection, remarking that “[s]ource identifica-
tion is the hallmark of trademark law, not copyright.”104
Finally, the court declined to grant copyright protection for
Darden’s website, citing the examiner’s explanation that elements
such as layout and formatting are not registrable and that AP-
PRAISERSdotCOM exhibited no other original elements.105  Thus,
the court concluded, the Register had correctly denied Darden’s re-
quest for copyright protection.106
IV. ANALYSIS
In Darden v. Peters,107 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that in reviewing a copyright protection action
brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts must apply a
deferential standard of review to the Register’s decision.108  In so
holding, the court correctly interpreted the APA and existing case law
and reached an appropriate conclusion in light of William Darden’s
claims.109  The court’s holding, however, raises the question of
whether the Register’s decisions merit the same degree of deference
as determinations by genuinely expert agencies, as copyrights do not
require the same degree of technical expertise.110  Although the result
in Darden would not likely have changed with the application of a less
deferential standard, the court should have applied a de novo stan-
dard of review for denials of copyright protection, thereby eliminating
separation of powers concerns in future, more ambiguous cases.111
A. The Court Correctly Interpreted the APA’s Deferential Standard and
Existing Case Law in Denying William Darden Copyright
Protection for His Website and Maps
The Darden court’s analysis of the standard of review under the
APA was proper for two reasons.  First, the plain meaning of the APA
mandates a deferential standard of review.112  Second, existing case
law concerning the standard of review under the APA indicates that a
deferential standard is appropriate.113  Further, the court properly ap-
104. Id. (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768–69 (1992)).
105. Id. at 287–88.
106. Id. at 288.
107. 488 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2007).
108. Id. at 286.
109. See infra Part IV.A.
110. See infra Part IV.B.
111. See infra Part IV.C.
112. See infra Part IV.A.1.
113. See infra Part IV.A.2.
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plied this standard to the facts of Darden’s case in denying copyright
protection to his maps and website.114
1. The Court Properly Concluded that the Plain Meaning of the APA
Requires an Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review
The Darden court correctly explained that the language of the
APA mandates a deferential standard of review in actions brought
under the APA.  The APA states, in pertinent part, that the reviewing
court will “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”115  The court’s conclu-
sion that the plain language of this provision allows only narrow
review116 comported with the Supreme Court’s analysis of the statute’s
language in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,117 in which the
Court emphasized that a reviewing court may not “substitute its judg-
ment for that of the agency.”118
2. The Court Properly Concluded that Federal Case Law Supports
Application of an Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review
The Darden court’s determination that the body of existing fed-
eral case law supported applying an abuse of discretion standard to
the Register’s decisions in actions under the APA was also appropri-
ate.  Although few federal courts have encountered the issue of the
proper standard of review in actions challenging the Register’s deter-
minations under the APA, those that have addressed this question
have unanimously applied an abuse of discretion standard to the Reg-
ister’s decisions.119  Thus, the Darden court’s conclusion that a defer-
ential standard of review applied120 comported with previous
applications of a deferential standard in actions under the APA.
114. See infra Part IV.A.3.
115. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
116. Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 286 (4th Cir. 2007).
117. 401 U.S. 402 (1971), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99,
105 (1977).
118. Id. at 416.
119. See Atari II, 979 F.2d 242, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1992); OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924
F.2d 346, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Coach, Inc. v. Peters, 386 F. Supp. 2d 495, 497 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
120. Darden, 488 F.2d at 288.
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3. The Court Properly Applied an Abuse of Discretion Standard to the
Facts of the Case at Bar to Conclude that William Darden
Was Not Entitled to Copyright Protection
The Darden court correctly applied the proper standard of review
to the present facts in holding that the Register had not abused her
discretion by denying William Darden copyright protection for his
maps and APPRAISERSdotCOM website.  The court’s analysis was cor-
rect for several reasons.  First, the court could not have reversed the
Register’s decision on the ground that the Register omitted an expla-
nation,121 applied an incorrect legal standard,122 or considered irrele-
vant factors123 because Darden did not challenge the Register’s
analysis or explanation; he claimed merely that the Register “reached
the wrong result.”124  A different holding would have contravened the
Supreme Court’s mandate that reviewing courts are not to substitute
their own judgment for that of the agency.125
Second, the court correctly upheld the Register’s denial of copy-
right protection for Darden’s maps based on an insufficient level of
originality.  The Register reasonably could have found that Darden’s
maps fell within the category, described in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Ru-
ral Telephone Services Co.,126 of works that lack the requisite level of cre-
ativity and, thus, are ineligible for copyright protection.127
Specifically, Darden’s additions to the maps, consisting solely of font,
coloring, labeling, and shading,128 did not demonstrate the “creative
spark” that Feist requires,129 given their commonplaceness and ex-
treme obviousness.  In addition, the court distinguished on the facts
the two cases that Darden cited to support his argument that maps are
121. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420–21 (remanding the case to the district court to
consider whether the agency’s explanation was sufficient).
122. Turgeau v. Admin. Review Bd., 446 F.3d 1052, 1057 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that
failure to apply the correct legal principles “is grounds for reversal” under section
706(2)(A) of the APA).
123. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (hold-
ing that the agency’s decision could be overturned if it considered or omitted factors it was
not supposed to consider or omit).
124. Darden, 488 F.3d at 284.
125. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43.
126. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
127. See id. at 359.  While the Darden court was justified in recognizing that maps are
generally categorically eligible for copyright registration, Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc.,
967 F.2d 135, 142 (5th Cir. 1992), the cases that Darden had cited in support of this pro-
position were inapposite to the instant determination, see infra note 130 and accompanying R
text.
128. Darden, 488 F.3d at 287.
129. Feist, 499 U.S. at 359, 363.
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generally copyrightable, and properly concluded that neither was ap-
plicable to the case at bar.130
Further, the court correctly rejected Darden’s allegation of origi-
nality based upon his customers’ confusion when they encountered
Darden’s maps on a competitor’s website:131 Because originality in
copyrights is determined as of the time of creation,132 indications of
public recognition, such as confusion or commercial success, are irrel-
evant to a determination of originality.133  Darden’s evidence sug-
gesting confusion did not establish that the Register’s determination
was improper and was, thus, appropriately rejected by the court.
Finally, the court was correct in upholding the Register’s determi-
nation regarding Darden’s claim for his APPRAISERSdotCOM web-
site.  The Register properly recognized that copyright protection in
compilations extends only to those elements added to the work that
are sufficiently original,134 and could plausibly have determined that
Darden’s additions of color, shading, and font to the maps lacked the
minimum level of creativity.  Moreover, while websites may contain
copyrightable elements, formatting and layout do not usually make
the work original enough to be registrable because it is “the selection,
coordination, and arrangement [of the elements that must be] suffi-
ciently original to merit protection.”135  The court, thus, acted appro-
130. See Darden, 488 F.3d at 287 & n.4 (citing Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159
F.3d 739, 746–48 (2d Cir. 1998); Mason, 967 F.2d at 142).  Specifically, the court observed
that Streetwise Maps considered the copyrightability of maps “in the context of an infringe-
ment claim” and that Mason involved more significant additions to the subject maps. Id. at
287 n.4.
131. Id. at 287 (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768–69
(1992)).
132. See Paul Morelli Design, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 200 F. Supp. 2d 482, 488 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (“A work is either original when created or it is not.”).
133. See id. (stating that commercial success or public attention over time does not estab-
lish originality because originality is determined as of the time of creation and cannot be
established by subsequent events).
134. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 359 (“The copyright in a compilation . . . extends only to the
material contributed by the author . . . as distinguished from the preexisting material em-
ployed in the work.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 103(b)
(2000))); Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] combination of unpro-
tectable elements is eligible for copyright protection only if those elements are numerous
enough and their selection and arrangement original enough that their combination con-
stitutes an original work of authorship.”); Dam Things from Den. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290
F.3d 548, 563 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that compilation authors may only claim protection
for original material they have added to the underlying work).
135. Feist, 499 U.S. at 358; see also Satava, 323 F.3d at 811 (holding that the selection and
arrangement of unprotectable elements must be “original enough that their combination
constitutes an original work of authorship”).
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priately in finding no abuse of discretion and in upholding the
Register’s denial of copyright protection.
B. The Court’s Holding Raises the Question of Whether the Register’s
Denial of Copyright Protection Should Be Given the Same
Deference as Determinations of Other Agencies
Although the Darden court correctly applied the APA and fol-
lowed case law in declining to adopt a de novo standard of review for
the denial of copyright protection,136 the court’s discussion of stan-
dards of review raises a question that the court has yet to answer: Does
the Register’s decision actually merit a deferential standard of review?
The APA applies to judicial review of decisions by numerous agencies,
including those by the PTO in granting or denying patent protection;
however, courts reviewing PTO determinations have emphasized that
agency’s technical expertise in the area of patents.137  Given that the
area of copyrights generally does not require comparable expertise, as
evidenced by the fact that courts review copyrightability in infringe-
ment actions de novo, copyrights should not be subject to the same
standard of review as agency decisions requiring technical expertise,
such as those by the PTO.138
1. The Supreme Court Has Applied the APA’s Deferential Standard
of Review to Denials of Patent Protection Because of the
PTO’s Technical Expertise
One rationale for application of a deferential standard of review
to agency decisions is agency expertise.139  In Dickinson v. Zurko,140 the
Supreme Court extended the APA’s abuse of discretion standard to
determinations by the PTO because of the agency’s specialized exper-
tise in the area of patents and trademarks.141  This justification for
136. See supra Part IV.A.
137. See infra Part IV.B.1.
138. See infra Part IV.B.2.
139. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard, Legitimacy and the Useful Arts, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 515,
551 (1997) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984)).
140. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
141. Id. at 152, 160–61 (observing that “the PTO is an expert body . . . [and] can better
deal with the technically complex subject matter”).  While the Federal Circuit has acquired
somewhat more expertise in the patent law area than other courts because it has exclusive
jurisdiction of appeals in patent law cases, Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 903 (Fed.
Cir. 2007), the PTO is still “best suited to comprehend and employ [technical] modalities
in the context of validity determinations,” Nard, supra note 139, at 519, 541–53. R
Nard opines that “[a]gency expertise has long been a justification for according defer-
ence.” Id. at 551.  Moreover, Nard has suggested that “one must view somewhat suspi-
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applying a deferential standard to PTO determinations is relevant
more broadly to many other agency decisions that receive deference
“because of [the agency’s] experience and the assistance of its techni-
cal staff.”142  As one scholar noted: “[D]eference will result in better
decision making because agencies have more expertise and greater
electoral accountability.”143
This is particularly true in the field of patents, which generally
requires technical expertise or knowledge not possessed by the review-
ing lay court.144  The PTO possesses such expertise in various fields of
technology, “and although a court may be able to learn [technical]
language, the PTO examiner has experience with the relevant tech-
nology.”145  Thus, courts apply an abuse of discretion standard of re-
view to determinations by many agencies because of the agencies’
expertise in their respective subject areas.
ciously a patent system that requires federal district judges and lay juries to . . .
comprehend and ascertain the meaning of sophisticated technological art.” Id. at 520.
Nard has further noted that “the PTO is likely to do better than jurors [and judges] because
the PTO, unlike the federal judiciary, employs individuals with training in exegesis in the
fields of patent law and technology.” Id. at 547 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
142. See United States ex rel. Chapman v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 191 F.2d 796, 808 (4th
Cir. 1951) (granting deference to the Federal Power Commission’s licensing determina-
tions because of agency expertise); see also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196
(1997) (noting that deference to Congress is similar to deference to administrative agen-
cies given the expertise of both bodies); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504,
512 (1994) (articulating the rationale for deference when “the regulation concerns a com-
plex and highly technical regulatory program” that requires “significant expertise” (emphasis
added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Martin v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991) (observing that agency decisionmaking
in complex situations requires specialized expertise); NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584,
597 (1941) (holding that courts could not substitute their judgment for that of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board because it is an “expert agenc[y] dealing with [a] specialized
field[ ]”); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 145–46 (1939) (giving defer-
ence to the FCC’s determination and referring to the agency as an “expert body”).
143. Phillip G. Oldham, Comment, Regulatory Consent Decrees: An Argument for Deference to
Agency Interpretations, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 418 (1995).
144. See Nard, supra note 139, at 536 (noting, as an example, that one court’s lack of R
technical expertise led it to apply principles of structural chemistry, as opposed to relevant
biological principles, which caused it to make a “dubious” determination that directly con-
tradicted that of the PTO); see also Chapman, 191 F.2d at 808 (noting that “[t]he court may
not . . . ignore the conclusions of [the agency] and put itself in the absurd position of
substituting its judgment for theirs on controverted matters of hydraulic engineering,” and
further opining that in such complex situations, deference to the agency is most crucial).
145. Nard, supra note 139, at 542. R
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2. Determinations of Copyrightability Should Not Be Subject to the
Same Standard of Review as Determinations by Expert
Agencies
Although agency determinations usually involve expertise in ac-
cordance with the general subject matter of the agency’s work,146 de-
terminations of copyrightability do not and, therefore, should not
receive the same level of deference.147  While courts may understanda-
bly be reluctant to depart from the APA standard in reviewing ques-
tions of copyrightability, several factors demonstrate why de novo
review of copyrightability is not only possible,148 but might also be per-
missible within the confines of existing case law.149
a. Determinations of Copyrightability Do Not Require Expertise
Comparable to That of Other Agencies
Unlike the determinations of many agencies that involve special
expertise by virtue of their subject matter,150 determinations as to
copyrightability do not require a comparable expertise.151  Given that
the touchstone of copyrightability is originality, which the Supreme
Court has clarified “means only that the work was independently cre-
ated by the author, as opposed to copied from other works, and that it
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity,”152 courts with no
technical expertise can undertake this analysis.  Specifically, an inter-
pretation of originality does not involve “complex” or “highly techni-
cal”153 considerations that fall within the particular purview of the
“agency’s unique expertise.”154
Moreover, it has been noted that, unlike in patent claims, the
Register does not evaluate an application for copyright protection for
“basic validity” before granting protection.155  As a result, “the Copy-
right Office is not equipped to gauge the author’s originality versus
146. See supra notes 141–145 and accompanying text. R
147. See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
148. See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
149. See infra Part IV.B.2.c.
150. See supra notes 141–145 and accompanying text. R
151. See Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 594 F. Supp. 364, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(“The Copyright Office’s scrutiny of an article for registration is not like the intense and
prolonged scrutiny required for patent and trademark registration.  Elements of copyright-
ability are viewed as largely legal questions and therefore equally within the expertise of the
courts.” (emphasis added)).
152. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
153. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).
154. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991).
155. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.11[B][3]
(2007) (citations omitted).
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copying, and will not reject an application, even if a strikingly similar
work has been previously registered.”156  Because the PTO conducts a
thorough review of an invention to ensure that it meets each require-
ment for patentability,157 courts are arguably justified in relying on
the PTO’s determination in this respect.158  However, such a justifica-
tion does not apply to the Register’s determinations given the lack of
an equivalent investigation into copyrightability.159  Determinations of
copyrightability, therefore, require little, if any, true expertise and, as
such, are within the analytical ability of any court.
b. Courts Are Able to Review the Issue of Copyrightability De Novo
Not only can courts review copyrightability de novo because the
Register does not possess a high level of specialized expertise in the
area,160 but they already do so in copyright infringement actions.161
156. Id. (citations omitted); see also Stein v. Mazer, 111 F. Supp. 359, 360 (D. Md. 1953)
(“[T]he issuance of the certificate of copyright is a perfunctory matter.  The Copyright
Office conducts no examination to determine the existence of novelty or invention in the
subject matter.”), rev’d on other grounds, 204 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1953).
The Register does, however, conduct a “substantive” evaluation of whether the appli-
cation “falls within the subject matter of copyright.” NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 155, R
§ 12.11[B][3].  In this area, its “expertise” has been recognized. See id. (“[T]he Copyright
Office presumably possesses special expertise in evaluating the subject matter of copy-
right . . . .”); see also Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 414 (observing that the Copyright Office’s
expertise is in “interpretation of the law and its application to the facts presented by the
copyright application” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Mays & Assocs.
Inc. v. Euler, 370 F. Supp. 2d 362, 369 (D. Md. 2005) (acknowledging the Copyright Of-
fice’s province to “exercise . . . its expertise” in its interpretation of copyright laws).  Such
acknowledgement of “expertise” purports to raise the Copyright Office to the level of other
“expert” agencies, thereby requiring a deferential standard of review because courts are
understandably hesitant to substitute their own judgment for that of any agency.  Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).  This argu-
ment is refuted, however, by the observation that courts possess comparable “expertise” in
applying the law. See, e.g., Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1980) (not-
ing courts’ expertise in “interpreting and applying the law” to the germane facts).
157. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 155, § 12.11[B][3]. R
158. See Oldham, supra note 143, at 417 (“It would be odd if courts were not allowed . . . R
to take advantage of agency knowledge and expertise.”).
159. See supra notes 155–156 and accompanying text. R
160. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
161. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2004); Yankee Candle Co. v.
Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 34 n.5 (1st Cir. 2001); Publ’ns Int’l v. Meredith
Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 1996); OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 348
(D.C. Cir. 1991); Collezione Europa U.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsdale House, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d
444, 452 (M.D.N.C. 2003); Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1253 (C.D. Cal.
2002), aff’d, 349 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003), amended on other grounds by 388 F.3d 1189 (9th
Cir. 2004).
Nevertheless, the Darden court did note that applying a de novo standard to copyright-
ability in infringement actions was “not a foregone conclusion” and cited courts that have
applied an abuse of discretion standard in infringement actions.  Darden v. Peters, 488
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Although the reasons for different standards of review in infringe-
ment actions and actions under the APA are statutory,162 the applica-
tion of a de novo standard in infringement cases illustrates that courts
are able to review the issue of copyrightability de novo.  Additionally, it
further suggests that such determinations require less technical exper-
tise than determinations as to patentability.163  From a logistical per-
spective, therefore, courts could review the issue of copyrightability in
actions directly challenging the Register’s denial using a de novo
standard.
c. Existing Case Law Does Not Require Strict Adherence to the
APA’s Deferential Standard in the Context of the Register’s
Decisions
Although courts may be wary of departing from the APA and per-
tinent case law discussing the applicable standard of review, some
commentary suggests that the APA is not necessarily a rigid stan-
dard.164  First, a strong dissent criticizing two preeminent Supreme
Court decisions supports the ability of courts to deviate from the APA
and apply a de novo standard of review to agency decisions.  Justice
Scalia, in a dissenting opinion in United States v. Mead Corp.,165 ques-
tioned the Court’s faithfulness to the APA in both Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council 166 and Mead.167  Indeed, Justice
Scalia viewed the holdings as departures from both the language of
the APA and precedent.168  Thus, Justice Scalia would argue that the
F.3d 277, 286 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing John Muller & Co. v. N.Y. Arrows Soccer Team, 802
F.2d 989, 990 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Norris Indus. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696
F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1983)); see also supra note 97 and accompanying text. R
162. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2000) (granting courts discretion in the weight they
accord agency decisionmaking when reviewing certificates of registration), with 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (2000) (requiring an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing agency ac-
tion under the APA).
163. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
164. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT. L.
REV. 1039, 1039 (1997) (observing that the APA is not a comprehensive code, but rather a
“framework statute”).
165. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
166. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
167. Mead, 533 U.S. at 241–42 & n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. Id.  In his dissent, Justice Scalia specifically criticized the majority’s lack of consider-
ation of the APA’s text, which he contended was “difficult to reconcile” with the majority’s
holding. Id.  Justice Scalia also noted that the Court in Chevron “did not even bother to
cite” to the APA’s actual text in purporting to interpret the level of deference it required.
Id. at 241.
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Supreme Court has previously departed from the language of the
APA.169
Second, one commentator has noted that, because the APA is a
“framework statute,” its application is defined chiefly by case law.170
The result is that “this interpretative mantle has assumed a different
shape with different generations of judges.”171  In other words, appli-
cation of the APA may fluctuate and change depending on the indi-
vidual interpretations of the courts touching on the issue.172  While
not a complete justification for courts to reject the APA’s deferential
standard when reviewing the Register’s determinations, this view nev-
ertheless supports the conclusion that alteration or denunciation of
the APA’s standard is not entirely unprecedented.
Moreover, despite the impressive body of case law upholding a
deferential standard under the APA,173 federal precedent on the spe-
cific issue of the APA’s standard of review in actions challenging de-
nial of copyright registration is minimal.174  Indeed, no court has
squarely addressed the issue of the Register’s expertise and whether
the same justification exists for applying a deferential standard to the
Register’s determinations as for applying a deferential standard to de-
cisions by genuinely expert agencies.
C. The Darden Court Should Have Challenged the Application of the
APA’s Deferential Standard to Denials of Copyright Protection
Though the court in Darden correctly applied the APA’s standard
of review and federal case law on the issue of deference to the Regis-
ter,175 it should have declined to apply a deferential standard in favor
of de novo review.  The outcome in Darden’s case would likely have
been the same under a de novo standard,176 but, by applying this stan-
dard, the court could have precluded separation of powers concerns
169. Id. at 241–42 & n.2.
170. See Merrill, supra note 164, at 1039. R
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. R
174. The Darden court commented on this phenomenon, noting that its holding was
“consistent with the few federal decisions . . . addressing the proper review standard under
the APA for courts directly reviewing a registration decision.”  Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d
277, 283 (4th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Atari II, 979 F.2d 242, 243 (D.C. Cir.
1992); OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 347–48 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Atari I, 888
F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Coach, Inc. v. Peters, 386 F. Supp. 2d 495, 497 (S.D.N.Y.
2005)).
175. See supra Part IV.A.
176. See infra Part IV.C.1.
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that will arise in cases where the issue of copyrightability is more
ambiguous.177
1. The Holding in Darden Likely Would Have Remained the Same
Under a De Novo Standard of Review
Even if the court had reviewed William Darden’s claims using a
de novo standard of review, the result would likely have been the
same.  A court undertaking de novo review will not accord deference
to the agency’s determination, but will independently analyze the
claim.178  In Darden, the first consideration under de novo review—
whether the work exhibits “constituent elements . . . that are copy-
rightable”179—would not have been met, as Darden’s alterations to
the original Census maps were minimal and the original Census maps
supplied the significant features of Darden’s maps.180  Additions of
color, font, and shading do not exhibit a “creative spark,”181 given
their obviousness, triviality, and widespread use.  Therefore, Darden’s
additions to the maps would not have satisfied the originality that Feist
requires.182
Darden’s APPRAISERSdotCOM claim would also likely have
failed.  Given that virtually the only pictorial elements on the website
were the maps, and that Darden’s sole additions to the Census maps—
font, coloring, visual effects, and labeling183—fell short of the origi-
nality standard because they were “practically inevitable,”184 AP-
PRAISERSdotCOM would not have satisfied the requirements for
protection as a derivative work.185  Moreover, APPRAISERSdotCOM
would not have qualified as a compilation because the “selection, co-
ordination, and arrangement” of the elements, which must “render
the work as a whole original” in order to make it copyrightable, failed
177. See infra Part IV.C.2.
178. See Atari I, 888 F.2d at 889 (Silberman, J., concurring) (explaining that under de
novo review, as used in infringement actions, the court is “not obliged to defer to an
agency’s action or interpretation”).
179. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2004) (ci-
tation and internal quotation marks omitted).
180. Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 280 (4th Cir. 2007).
181. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359 (1991).
182. See id. at 345.
183. Darden, 488 F.3d at 280–82.
184. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 363 (explaining that the alphabetical arrangement of tele-
phone numbers is inevitable and, thus, lacking the requisite originality for
copyrightability).
185. See Dam Things from Den. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 563 (3d Cir. 2002)
(clarifying that protection for derivative works extends only to added elements that satisfy
the originality standard).
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to transform the website into an original work.186  Therefore,
Darden’s claims would ultimately have been dismissed under a de
novo standard.
2. The Court’s Application of a Deferential Standard of Review to the
Register’s Decisions Could Raise Separation of Powers
Concerns
Although the outcome in Darden would probably have been unaf-
fected by application of a de novo standard of review,187 had the court
applied a de novo standard, it could have eliminated the potential
problem involving separation of government powers.  For courts to
extend deference to agencies regardless of whether the agencies have
expertise in a given area raises separation of powers concerns in that it
accords a body of the executive branch authority in its decisionmak-
ing that treads dangerously close to usurping the role of the judici-
ary.188  Specifically, the traditional justification for deference—agency
expertise189—is inapplicable to the Register’s determinations as to
copyrightability, given that the relevant analysis of copyright applica-
tions requires no special expertise.190  Indeed, the evaluation of origi-
nality that the Register undertakes for works submitted for copyright
protection is strikingly analogous to the traditional role of courts in
applying law to facts191 and in “say[ing] what the law is.”192  The Su-
186. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 358 (determining that the “selection, coordination, and ar-
rangement” at issue did not meet the originality requirement).  In particular, Darden’s
additions to APPRAISERSdotCOM consisted primarily of formatting and layout, which are
not protectable. Darden, 488 F.3d at 282.
187. See supra Part IV.C.1.
188. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 929 n.6 (1991) (noting that the system of
checks and balances in American government was designed to protect “the role of the
independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government” (cita-
tions and internal quotation marks omitted)); County of Esmeralda v. U.S. Dep’t of En-
ergy, 925 F.2d 1216, 1223 (9th Cir. 1991) (Wallace, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (noting that the deference granted to certain agency actions by courts is a reflec-
tion of agency expertise in particularly executive arenas where court interference may up-
set the separation of powers).
189. See supra Part IV.B.1.
190. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
191. Compare Norris Indus. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1983)
(observing that courts often defer to the Register’s determinations regarding “the interpre-
tation of the law and its application to the facts presented by the copyright application”),
and supra Part II.A, with Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 277 (1974) (per curiam)
(explaining that courts apply law to facts), and Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488, 492
(5th Cir. 1980) (observing that courts have expertise in applying legal standards to facts).
192. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Elliot Greenfield, A
Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (noting that “the Chev-
ron rule of deference would appear to contradict . . . Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous
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preme Court has made clear that “the judicial Power of the United
States vested in the federal courts by [Article] III, [Section] 1, of the
Constitution can no more be shared with the Executive Branch than
the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto
power . . . .”193  Thus, if courts automatically defer to the Register’s
determinations, this would constitute an “intrusion”194 by the execu-
tive branch into the traditional role of the judiciary.
This risk would be most apparent in situations where the issue of
originality is less clear than in Darden.  In such cases, courts might
conceivably determine that the law instructs them to reach a conclu-
sion at odds with the Register’s decision but that the Register’s deci-
sion does not rise to the level of “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or . . . not in accordance with law.”195  If the reviewing
court defers to the Register, however, it would be unable to reach
such an independent conclusion regarding originality.196  As a result,
the Register, barring application of an incorrect legal standard or con-
sideration of inappropriate factors,197 would have virtually unfettered
discretion in granting or denying copyrights.  This would effectively
eliminate one of the fundamental purposes of judicial review: to put a
check on the Executive’s exercise of its authority.198
pronouncement in Marbury v. Madison that ‘it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is’” (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177)).
193. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974), superseded by rule on other grounds,
FED. R. EVID. 104(a).  Although separation of powers does not require “a complete division
of authority between the three branches,” there must be some degree of separation.  Nixon
v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
194. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 381 (2004) (explaining that the issu-
ance of a writ by the lower court could intrude into federal-state relations).
195. 5 U.S.C. § 706(A) (2000).
196. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (noting that, under a deferential standard, courts may not substitute their judg-
ment for that of the agency).
197. See id. (holding that application of an incorrect legal standard could warrant rever-
sal); Turgeau v. Admin. Review Bd., 446 F.3d 1052, 1057 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining that
failure to apply the correct legal standard and consideration of inappropriate factors con-
stitute grounds for reversal).
198. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging constitutional “separateness” of the branches of govern-
ment); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 302 (2004) (plurality opinion) (explaining
that “lines of separation drawn by the Constitution between the three departments of the
government” prevent one branch from extending its authority into the authority of an-
other branch (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 380–81 (1989) (discussing the constitutional understanding of separation of
powers and emphasizing that diffusing powers between the three branches best protects
“the fundamental principles of a free constitution”).
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V. CONCLUSION
In Darden v. Peters,199 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that the correct standard of review for the Register’s denial of
copyright registration under the APA was an abuse of discretion stan-
dard and upheld the Register’s denial of protection to William
Darden.200  In so holding, the court correctly interpreted both the
plain language of the APA and case law on the subject,201 but it failed
to address whether the justification for application of a deferential
standard applies to the Copyright Office.202  Instead, the court should
have acknowledged that determinations of copyrightability do not re-
quire an expertise comparable to that required, for instance, in deter-
minations of patentability by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office.203  The application of a de novo standard would likely not have
altered the outcome in Darden’s case, but it might very well have im-
pacted the resolution of more ambiguous cases in the future, and it
would also have addressed the separation of powers concerns raised
by the more deferential abuse of discretion standard.204
RAISA L. MICHALEK
199. 488 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2007).
200. Id. at 286, 288.
201. See supra Part IV.A.
202. See supra Part IV.B.
203. See supra Part IV.B.
204. See supra Part IV.C.
